Illinois Adoption Unfitness Determination: What Appellate Courts Look For

The Trial Court’s Error: Blending Two Separate Statutory Grounds

In In re Adoption of D.J.E., 2026 IL App (4th) 251115-U, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s denial of an adoption petition and remanded the case for a best-interest hearing. At the heart of the decision was a critical procedural mistake: the trial court treated two distinct statutory grounds for unfitness as if they were a single inquiry.

Under 750 ILCS 50/1(D), a parent can be found unfit on multiple grounds. In the D.J.E. case, the guardians seeking to adopt established two separate grounds: (1) the parent’s failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the child under § 1(D)(b), and (2) the parent’s manifestation of intent to forgo parental rights under § 1(D)(n). The trial court, however, blended these two grounds into one analysis (¶104). That mistake cost it on appeal.

The Fourth District’s reversal underscores a principle that adoption practitioners must understand: each statutory ground requires its own legal analysis. They ask different questions. They apply different standards. And they evaluate the evidence through different lenses.

Section 1(D)(b): The Reasonableness Standard

The first ground—failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, care, or responsibility—invites a contextual inquiry. Under this standard, courts consider the reasonableness of the parent’s conduct in light of the circumstances (¶91). A parent’s failure to visit or communicate might be reasonable if, for example, the parent was incarcerated, hospitalized, or genuinely prevented by the guardian from making contact. The focus is not purely on the outcome—whether contact occurred—but on whether the parent’s conduct was reasonable given the situation.

This ground is less formulaic. It invites courts to weigh factors: the parent’s health, economic circumstances, geographic distance, and the like. The question becomes: was the parent’s response to the circumstances of the case reasonable?

Section 1(D)(n): The Objective Conduct Standard

The second ground—manifestation of intent to forgo parental rights by failure to visit, communicate, or maintain contact for 12 months or more—operates differently. This ground does not invite the same contextual reasonableness analysis (¶96). Instead, it focuses on objective conduct: did the parent maintain contact or not? The statute includes a presumption: “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the ability to visit, communicate, maintain contact, pay expenses, and plan for the future shall be presumed” (¶96).

Under this ground, subjective intent alone is insufficient. A parent cannot say, “I wanted to maintain contact but chose not to,” and expect that to defeat a finding of unfitness. The statute presumes the ability to act. The question is whether the parent actually did so—and if not, whether objective impediments external to the parent excused the failure.

The trial court’s error in the D.J.E. case was treating these as one inquiry. It applied a reasonableness framework to the intent-to-forgo ground, which is not how the statute works (¶104).

How the Fourth District Applied the Correct Standard

The Fourth District addressed each ground separately. On the intent-to-forgo ground, the court looked to the facts:

• The mother’s last contact with the child occurred in September 2022 (¶107).
• The father’s last contact occurred at the end of 2021 or beginning of 2022 (¶107).
• Both time periods far exceeded the 12-month threshold.
• Both parents had the ability to contact the guardians. The guardians’ contact information—Facebook, email, phone, Instagram—was publicly available and never blocked (¶¶59-64).
• Neither parent had presented competent evidence of objective impediments that prevented contact (¶¶107-110, 122).

On these facts, the Fourth District concluded that the evidence established intent to forgo by clear and convincing evidence. The court emphasized that the presumption of ability, combined with the failure to act, pointed to only one conclusion (¶122).

Why This Distinction Matters for Your Case

If you are pursuing an adoption petition in Illinois, understanding the difference between § 1(D)(b) and § 1(D)(n) is essential. Across more than 2,300 adoption and guardianship matters our firm has handled, the unfitness determination is the stage where cases are most often won or lost — and the distinction between these two statutory grounds is frequently at the center of contested proceedings. A trial court that conflates them, as the D.J.E. trial court did, creates reversible error. Conversely, if you are defending against a finding of unfitness, you must know which ground the evidence targets and tailor your response accordingly.

For § 1(D)(b), the focus is reasonableness. Build a record that demonstrates your efforts were reasonable given your circumstances. For § 1(D)(n), the focus shifts to objective conduct and impediments. The burden is on you to rebut the presumption of ability with concrete evidence—not subjective preference or intent.

The Fourth District’s clear restatement of this distinction in D.J.E. provides helpful guidance for practitioners on both sides of adoption cases.

The Two-Step Process: Unfitness and Best Interest

The D.J.E. reversal is significant for another reason: it reminds us that finding unfitness is step one. Step two is the best-interest hearing. The trial court’s error in conflating the two unfitness grounds was compounded by its failure to proceed to the second step. On remand, the trial court will conduct a separate best-interest analysis—a different inquiry with different legal standards.

The appellate process in D.J.E. illustrates the importance of proper legal framework. When trial courts skip steps or blur distinct statutory standards, appellate review becomes necessary. Practitioners who understand the structure—separate grounds, separate standards, separate stages—can advocate more effectively and avoid the kinds of reversals we see in this case.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the difference between 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) and 1(D)(n)?

Section 1(D)(b) requires proof that the parent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, care, or responsibility toward the child. This standard is contextual and invites examination of the parent’s circumstances and whether the parent’s conduct was reasonable. Section 1(D)(n) addresses intent to forgo parental rights and focuses on objective conduct—specifically, the failure to visit, communicate, or maintain contact for 12 months or more. The § 1(D)(n) standard presumes the parent’s ability to act and does not require the same contextual reasonableness analysis. Courts must evaluate each ground separately.

Can a parent claim subjective intent as a defense under the intent-to-forgo ground?

No. Subjective intent—what the parent says they wanted to do—cannot overcome clear evidence of inaction under § 1(D)(n). The statute presumes a parent has the ability to visit, communicate, and maintain contact unless objective evidence to the contrary is presented. A parent’s claim that they “wanted to stay in touch” does not rebut this presumption. The focus is on what the parent actually did, not what they say they felt.

What counts as an objective impediment under § 1(D)(n)?

An objective impediment is an external barrier, not within the parent’s control, that prevents contact. Examples include court orders prohibiting contact, agency obstruction, or guardian refusal to facilitate visitation. Subjective beliefs about what is “better” for the child or opinions about court procedures do not qualify as objective impediments. Similarly, a parent’s belief that an attorney advised a particular course of action—without concrete evidence—does not excuse failure to maintain contact in other ways (such as by letter, gift, or phone call).

Why did the Fourth District reverse the trial court’s decision in D.J.E.?

The Fourth District reversed because the trial court improperly blended the two unfitness grounds into a single analysis, applying a reasonableness standard that is appropriate for § 1(D)(b) to the intent-to-forgo analysis under § 1(D)(n). Additionally, the evidence clearly established that both parents failed to maintain contact for well over 12 months, both parents had the objective ability to contact the guardians (whose contact information was publicly available), and neither parent presented competent evidence of objective impediments. Under the correct legal standard, the evidence supported a finding of intent to forgo parental rights.

If you have questions about adoption in Illinois, the Peoria adoption attorneys at Parker & Parker are here to help.

Related Articles

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• Intent to Forgo Parental Rights in Illinois: How Courts Evaluate the Evidence
• The Two-Step Adoption Process in Illinois: Fitness First, Then Best Interest
• How to Adopt a Child in Illinois
• Starting the Adoption Journey in Illinois
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• Why Adoption Appeals Matter: Appellate Review in Illinois Adoption Cases