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Illinois Adoption Unfitness Determination: What Appellate Courts Look For

Thu 19 Mar, 2026 / by / Adoption Law

Last Updated: October 29, 2026

Subsection (D)(b) is failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child’s welfare. Paragraph 91 says that inquiry examines the parent’s conduct in the context of the circumstances. Subsection (D)(n)(1) is a failure for a period of 12 months: to visit the child; to communicate with the child or the agency, although able to do so and not prevented by an agency or by court order; or to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically able to do so. Paragraph 87 decides fitness first. If the parent is unfit, the court then decides whether termination and adoption are in the child’s best interest.


The Trial Court’s Error: Blending Two Separate Statutory Grounds

In In re Adoption of D.J.E., 2026 IL App (4th) 251115-U, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, reversed the denial of the adoption petition and remanded for a best-interest hearing. Paragraph 104 states that the trial court blended the two unfitness allegations.

Paragraphs 3 and 15 identify the petition’s two allegations as subsection (D)(b), failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility, and subsection (D)(n)(1), an intent to forgo parental rights. Paragraph 123 holds that the petitioners proved the intent-to-forgo ground. Paragraph 104 states that the trial court blended the two allegations and did not correctly address the intent-to-forgo determination.

Paragraph 104 states that reasonableness belongs to the reasonable-interest allegation, and that the intent-to-forgo allegation involves different legal determinations. Paragraph 88 requires unfitness to be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 1(D)(b): The Reasonableness Standard

Subsection (D)(b) is failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child’s welfare. Paragraph 91 quotes the rule that the court examines the parent’s conduct in the context of the circumstances. The same paragraph quotes the factors of transportation difficulty, poverty, the actions or statements of others that hinder or discourage visitation, and whether the failure to visit was motivated by other aspects of the parent’s life or by indifference.

Paragraph 92 states that even extreme circumstances do not excuse a complete lack of communication or interest. If personal visits are impractical, letters, telephone calls, and gifts may show a reasonable degree of concern, interest, and responsibility, depending on their content, tone, and frequency.

Section 1(D)(n): The Objective Conduct Standard

Subsection (D)(n)(1) is a failure for a period of 12 months: to visit the child; to communicate with the child or the agency, although able to do so and not prevented by an agency or by court order; or to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically able to do so. Paragraph 96 distinguishes that ground from the reasonable-interest inquiry. It quotes the presumption: “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the ability to visit, communicate, maintain contact, pay expenses, and plan for the future shall be presumed.”

Paragraph 96 also quotes the Act’s next sentence. Subjective intent, unsupported by evidence of the listed parental acts, shall not preclude a determination that the parent intended to forgo parental rights. Paragraph 100 states that the court may consider objective impediments during the 12-month period, and that the court is not limited to obstacles presented solely by an agency or by court order.

Paragraph 104 states that the trial court found the failure to maintain contact was reasonable, and that it never specifically or correctly addressed the intent-to-forgo determination.

How the Fourth District Applied the Correct Standard

The Fourth District addressed each ground separately. On the intent-to-forgo ground, the court looked to the facts:

  • The petitioner testified that the mother’s last in-person contact was in August 2022 (¶66).
  • The father testified that his last in-person contact was in 2021 and his last electronic contact was in late 2021 or early 2022 (¶59).
  • Paragraph 107 states that the failure to make contact for well over 12 months from the last contact was undisputed, and that no competent evidence rebutted the presumption that the mother was able to make contact.
  • Paragraphs 118 and 119 find no objective impediment for either parent.
  • Paragraph 122 states that the lack of effort was not excused by objective impediments during the 12-month period.

Paragraph 122 states that the only conclusion from the record is that the petitioners proved the intent-to-forgo ground by clear and convincing evidence.

Why This Distinction Matters for Your Case

If you are pursuing an adoption petition in Illinois, understanding the difference between § 1(D)(b) and § 1(D)(n) is essential. Across more than 2,300 adoption and guardianship matters our firm has handled, the unfitness determination is the stage where cases are most often won or lost, and the distinction between these two statutory grounds is frequently at the center of contested proceedings. A trial court that conflates them, as the D.J.E. trial court did, creates reversible error. Conversely, if you are defending against a finding of unfitness, you must know which ground the evidence targets and tailor your response accordingly.

For subsection (D)(b), paragraph 91 examines conduct in context. For subsection (D)(n)(1), paragraph 96 presumes ability in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Subjective intent, unsupported by the listed acts, shall not preclude the determination.

The Fourth District’s clear restatement of this distinction in D.J.E. provides helpful guidance for practitioners on both sides of adoption cases.

The Two-Step Process: Unfitness and Best Interest

Paragraph 87 states the sequence. The court decides fitness first. If a parent is unfit, the court then decides whether termination and adoption are in the child’s best interest. Paragraph 4 states that the trial court denied the petition because the petitioners had not proved unfitness. Paragraph 123 reverses that fitness determination and remands for the best-interest hearing.

The appellate process in D.J.E. illustrates the importance of proper legal framework. When trial courts skip steps or blur distinct statutory standards, appellate review becomes necessary. Practitioners who understand the structure, separate grounds, separate standards, separate stages, can advocate more effectively and avoid the kinds of reversals we see in this case.

Considering Adoption in Illinois?

The attorneys at Parker & Parker help families navigate every stage of the adoption process. Call 309-673-0069 or schedule a consultation to discuss your situation today.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the difference between 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) and 1(D)(n)?

Subsection (D)(b) is failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility. Paragraph 91 examines that conduct in context. Subsection (D)(n)(1) is a failure for a period of 12 months: to visit the child; to communicate with the child or the agency, although able to do so and not prevented by an agency or by court order; or to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically able to do so. Paragraph 96 presumes ability in the absence of contrary evidence and distinguishes that inquiry from the reasonable-interest ground. Paragraph 104 requires the court to address the allegations separately.

Can a parent claim subjective intent as a defense under the intent-to-forgo ground?

Paragraph 96 quotes the Act. Subjective intent, unsupported by evidence of the listed parental acts, shall not preclude a determination that the parent intended to forgo parental rights. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the ability to visit, communicate, maintain contact, pay expenses, and plan for the future is presumed.

What counts as an objective impediment under § 1(D)(n)?

Paragraph 100 states that a court may consider objective impediments during the 12-month period that are external to the parent, and that the court is not limited to obstacles presented solely by an agency or by court order. Paragraph 101 states that the H.B. refusals of visits and phone contact, and the statement that the child did not want to see the mother, rebutted an unfitness finding.

Why did the Fourth District reverse the trial court’s decision in D.J.E.?

Paragraph 104 states that the trial court blended the two allegations and applied reasonableness to a blended issue. Paragraph 107 states that the failure to make contact for well over 12 months from the last contact was undisputed. Paragraph 122 states that the lack of effort was not excused by objective impediments and that the petitioners proved the intent-to-forgo ground by clear and convincing evidence.

If you have questions about adoption in Illinois, the Peoria adoption attorneys at Parker & Parker are here to help.

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Author: Robert Parker

Posted: March 19, 2026

Category: Firm News

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